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BERKSHIRE’S DISINTERMEDIATION:
BUFFETT’S NEW MANAGERIAL MODEL
Lawrence A. Cunningham
Abstract
Berkshire Hathaway, among history’s largest and most successful corporations, shuns
middlemen; its chairman, the legendary investor Warren Buffett, excoriates financial
intermediaries. The acquisitive conglomerate rarely borrows money, retains brokers, or
hires consultants. Its governance is lean, using an advisory board and bucking all forms of
corporate bureaucracy. Berkshire’s shareholders also minimize the roles of intermediaries
like stockbrokers and stock exchanges by trading little and holding for lengthy periods.
By exploring Berkshire’s antipathy to intermediation, this article supports the view
that public policy ought to make considerable room for companies to define their own
internal business practices and that more companies ought to consider emulating aspects of
Berkshire’s disintermediation. While Buffett’s legacy to date has been to lead two
generations of value investors, Berkshire’s radically ingenious disintermediation has the
potential to shape the next two generations of value managers, as argued in this paper and
at greater length in the author’s recent book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value
of Values.
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INTRODUCTION
Berkshire Hathaway’s Warren Buffett is famous for dissing financial intermediaries—he is
not only a champion of disintermediation but a lifelong practitioner of non-intermediation. 1
At Berkshire, a publicly-traded holding company, disintermediation is acute at the parent
level. 2 It starts with a governance structure featuring Buffett, a controlling shareholder who
effectively founded the firm in 1965 and has served continuously as its chairman and chief
executive since 1970. Today, from an office with two dozen staff in Omaha, Nebraska,
Buffett is the steward of a sprawling conglomerate that employs 340,000 people.
Berkshire’s formal governance is headed by Buffett’s handpicked board of directors,
his friends and family, who pride themselves more for being just like shareholders than on
serving as monitors of management for them. Berkshire’s shareholder body embraces the
company’s unusual approach to corporate governance and concurs with Buffett’s aversion
to intermediaries, trading lightly in the stock to the dismay of stockbrokers and concentrating
their portfolios in it despite financial advisory orthodoxy to diversify.
Eighty percent of Berkshire’s nearly $600 billion in assets are operated by its sixty
principal subsidiaries, supplemented by a portfolio of securities in other companies
representing the remaining twenty percent of total assets. Built over five decades through
scores of acquisitions and investments, Berkshire has rarely borrowed money, retained a
business broker to scout for acquisition targets, or engaged an investment banker for advice.
Upon acquisition of a company, Berkshire gives unit chiefs carte blanche to run their
businesses without interfacing with parent level officers on anything except financial
reporting and internal auditing. The decentralized model, akin to disintermediation, lacks the
tight control protocols common in corporate America, inculcating instead a trust-based
culture of stewardship with a record of strong profitability. Any subsidiary seeking financing
need only request it from Berkshire, without resorting to the intermediated channels of
America’s system of corporate finance. 3
Berkshire’s success using an unorthodox approach underscores the value of
flexibility in governance design, the appeal of a trust-based corporate culture, and the
capacity for self-reliance in lieu of intermediaries. The variety of distribution channels in its
subsidiaries and investees reflects the utility of alternative degrees of mediation, ruled by
factors such as the efficacy of self-reliance. While the exact normative implications of
Berkshire’s complex story are more contestable than its descriptive accomplishments, the
touchstone is pragmatism over ideology, with weighty roles for autonomy, efficiency, and
thrift.
I. GOVERNANCE
In 1956, a twenty-six year old Warren Buffett formed an investment partnership to
acquire small businesses and equity stakes in larger companies. In 1965, the partnership took
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control of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., a publicly-held and struggling textile manufacturer. The
Buffett Partnership soon dissolved, with Berkshire shares distributed to the partners.
Berkshire proceeded to acquire interests in diverse businesses, including insurance,
manufacturing, finance, and newspapers. Its results through 2015 have vastly exceeded
benchmarks such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or Standard & Poor’s 500. From 1965
to 2015, the Dow increased eighteen-fold while Berkshire increased by 12,000 times, a
compound annual rate of 21%, double the S&P.
Despite the change from the partnership to the corporate form, Buffett has always
preserved the sense of partnership at Berkshire. The legacy is reflected in the first of fifteen
principles stated for decades in Berkshire’s “owners’ manual”: “While our form is corporate,
our attitude is partnership.” 4 The “Berkshire system,” as vice chairman Charlie Munger
dubbed it recently, 5 differs significantly from prevailing practices at other large American
corporations. And while legions of investors have attempted to mimic Buffett’s investment
philosophy, few have emulated Berkshire’s corporate practices. 6 Yet the Berkshire system
has many advantages. 7
A. Buffett
Berkshire differs from the typical public company model characterized by separation
of share ownership from managerial control and associated agency costs. 8 Rather, Buffett
has been Berkshire’s controlling shareholder since 1965. He initially owned forty-five
percent of Berkshire’s voting and economic interest; today, having made annual transfers of
shares for charitable purposes for a decade, Buffett owns thirty-four percent of Berkshire’s
voting power and twenty-one percent of its economic interest. 9
So Berkshire may not have needed many of the devices designed to control agency
costs in public companies, which often entail intermediation. But controlling shareholders
create another set of agency costs for minority shareholders. 10 And Berkshire’s unparalleled
success and thorough renunciation of such devices makes it wise to ask whether they are
necessary or desirable at companies without a controlling shareholder too.
Buffett is, in effect, Berkshire’s founder, as he transformed the company from a
struggling textile manufacturer into an investment vehicle and then a conglomerate.
Throughout most of that time, since 1970, he has also served as Berkshire’s only chief
executive and board chairman. Such longevity is unique—most modern CEO tenures are far
shorter and even legendary long-serving CEOs had tenures half that, including Alfred Sloan,
John D. Rockefeller and John F. Welch. The tenure enabled Buffett to put a seemingly
indelible imprint on the company, highlighted by non-intermediation. While some
companies and advocates endorse age limits for officers and term limits for directors,
Berkshire’s shareholders have gained substantially thanks to Buffett’s long tenure in both
roles.
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Buffett’s attitude of partnership is one of profound disintermediation. The owners’
manual elaborates: “We do not view the company itself as the ultimate owner of our business
assets but, instead, view the company as a conduit through which our shareholders own the
assets.” That view, aptly called “radical,” disintegrates the corporate veil. 11 While Buffett
views shareholders as the owners of Berkshire, corporate law defines them as merely owning
shares of its equity, the residual interest after assets are offset by liabilities. Buffett takes the
partnership conception to mean that managers, starting with himself, are stewards of
shareholder capital, accepting a higher standard of obligation than law imposes—perhaps as
as lofty as that which Benjamin Cardozo said partners owe one another: “a punctilio of an
honor the most sensitive.”
In pursuing that standard, Buffett treats Berkshire’s other shareholders the way he
would want to be treated if positions were reversed. In disclosure, for example, he explains
business decisions candidly, admits mistakes, and catalogues the events that have defined
Berkshire culture—al in the style of an equal partner rather than a corporate chief
executive. 12 Buffett writes to Berkshire shareholders directly, without the intermediation of
communications professionals, and hosts an annual meeting where he fields questions from
shareholders for up to six hours straight. Berkshire’s policies, and Buffett’s explanations of
them, are designed to attract shareholders and business owners who agree with the
philosophy, which champions radical disintermediation in favor self-reliance and savings
(you cannot outsource stewardship).
B. The Advisory Board
Buffett’s controlling position has allowed him to nominate and elect Berkshire’s
board of directors from the outset. During that time, Berkshire’s board came to assume
characteristics quite different from that of typical public companies today. From the earliest
decades, the board included Buffett’s wife and close friends and, since 1993, his son. It was
and remains a classic advisory board, common in the U.S. before the corporate governance
revolution that began in the 1980s, and now nearly extinct. 13
Since the 1990s, the regulation and norms of corporate governance shifted to
increasingly define a board’s role to monitor management, as intermediaries on behalf of
shareholders. That means independent directors, often a powerful non-executive chairman,
along with numerous strong committees (on governance, board nominations, and CEO
review) all overseeing elaborate systems of internal control. In theory, the monitoring board
improved oversight on behalf of shareholders, fortified by shareholder advocates, such as
institutional investor councils and shareholder advisory services. While sometimes effective,
such a regime produces the potentially inert result of “agents watching agents.” At Berkshire,
they call it bureaucracy. Whatever its merit elsewhere, no such intermediaries play any role
at Berkshire and its board cannot be classified as a monitoring board. 14
True, Berkshire’s board adheres to legal requirements concerning requisite
committees, independence, and expertise. Its audit committee, for example, excludes
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Buffett, who would not be “independent,” includes at least one financially literate member,
and oversees the legally-mandated internal audit function. 15 In form, Berkshire has added
numerous outside directors, in the sense that they are not employees and don’t have direct
economic ties. In fact, however, all are handpicked by Buffett and have personal or
professional connections to him. They are chosen because of their integrity, savvy, ownerorientation, and interest in Berkshire, not for their status. 16 Indeed, half the board members
are older than sixty-five and most have served Berkshire for a decade or more—facts that
would compel their departure under typical age-limit and term-limit regimes endorsed by
some shareholder advocates.
Further, Berkshire directors own Berkshire stock—many in large quantities—all
purchased by them with cash rather than awarded by the company in stock-based
compensation plans, commonly used in corporate America on the advice of executive
compensation consultants. Berkshire pays its directors token fees, typically $1,000 per
meeting, while directors at like-sized companies average $250,000 per year. 17 Berkshire’s
directors serve because of their direct interest, not for the money. Berkshire does not buy
directors’ insurance that other boards take for granted, omitting another mini-bureaucracy
from its corporate governance.
Berkshire’s principal parent-level activity is accumulating and allocating capital,
often making substantial acquisitions. At most companies, CEOs might formulate a general
acquisition program with little board involvement and then present specific proposals to the
board, which discusses deal terms and approves funding. The board’s role in this setting is
an example of its service as an intermediary. Berkshire does the opposite, enabling Buffett
to seize opportunities that would be lost if prior board involvement occurred. 18
Buffett shares with the board the general philosophy of acquisitions and might
discuss large deals with it in advance in conceptual terms. But the board is uninvolved in
valuation, structuring, or funding any specific acquisition. With few exceptions, the board
does not find out about an acquisition until after it is publicly announced. Rather, overtures,
discussions, and negotiations are kept confidential, limited at most to a few Berkshire
insiders, typically including Munger. 19
Berkshire’s board has two regularly scheduled boards meetings annually, not the
more typical eight to twelve at other Fortune 500 companies. Formal aspects of Berkshire
board meetings follow the familiar business pattern. In recent decades, succession planning
has been discussed regularly at virtually every meeting. Before each meeting, directors
receive a report from Berkshire’s internal auditing team. Berkshire’s spring board meeting
coincides with Berkshire’s annual shareholders’ meeting in May.
Directors spend several days in Omaha, corporate headquarters, mingling in social
gatherings with Berkshire officers, subsidiary managers, and shareholders. The fall meeting
features opportunities to meet one or more CEOs of Berkshire subsidiaries, either in Omaha
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or at a sub’s corporate headquarters. One or more CEOs make presentations and exchange
ideas with the directors and fellow unit chiefs.
According to director Susan Decker, Berkshire’s approach to board meetings,
especially involving the directors in Berkshire events outside of the boardroom, produces a
“strong inculcation of culture.” Cynics might say such an environment promotes structural
bias that can impair the independent judgment corporate governance advocates have hailed
in recent decades. 20 But this immersion of directors in Berkshire culture flattens the typical
hierarchies of corporate governance, keeping directors in shareholders’ shoes, the
culmination of disintermediation in Berkshire’s governance that has proven effective.
C. Fellow Owners
Berkshire’s shareholders are unusual and have traits that take out intermediaries as
well. They embrace the idea of Berkshire as a partnership. They believe that they are owners,
and relish that Berkshire has no corporate veil, no monitoring board, and no corporate
bureaucracy or hierarchies. Buffett’s fellow owners more nearly resemble partners in a
private firm than shareholders of a public company.
Most Berkshire shares are owned by individuals and families, not firms and funds.
Typically, large public companies see seventy to eighty percent of their shares controlled by
institutional investors. Decisions are often intermediated by committee and based on
financial models that can lead to trading the stock for reasons unrelated to the company. In
contrast, at Berkshire a large portion of the voting power and economic interest are
controlled by individuals and families, who focus on their specific situation and Berkshire’s
specific characteristics.
Berkshire shareholders have long holding periods. In the past decade, share turnover
has been less than one percent compared to three, four, or five percent for other
conglomerates, large insurance companies, or Berkshire’s formerly-public subsidiaries. 21
As of 1996, at a time when Berkshire’s shares traded above $35,000 per share, ninety
percent of the shares had a basis of less than $100—meaning that they had held for two or
three decades. 22 While more active shareholders may need and value extensive
intermediation of stockbrokers, mutual fund managers, and stock exchanges, the typical
Berkshire shareholders need little of that.
At most public companies, individual shareholders are rationally apathetic, relying
on intermediaries to make decisions. They skip reading company reports, including
chairman letters, which are often ghostwritten by the corporate communications department,
and rarely attend meetings, which verge on formal ritual, thanks to staging by intermediaries
such as public relations experts. In contrast, Berkshire shareholders study Berkshire’s annual
report, and especially Buffett’s shareholder letters, which he writes himself—there is no
corporate communications department. 23 Berkshire shareholders flock to its annual
meetings. Attendance has risen from 7,500 in 1997 to 21,000 in 2004; 35,000 in 2008; and
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40,000 in 2013. 24 At these meetings, un-rehearsed and un-choreographed substantive
business discussion takes, where Buffett and Munger spend the entire day on stage
answering scores of questions from shareholders. 25
Sophisticated investors generally follow conventional wisdom—and the typical
advice of financial advisors—to avoid concentrating portfolios in the stock of any one
company. Among holders who publicly disclose stakes, for instance, few of the largest
hundred shareholders of blue chip companies like Apple, ExxonMobil, and General Electric
allocate more than five percent of their portfolios to that company’s stock. In contrast,
Berkshire shareholders tend to concentrate in its stock. For example, forty-three of the
hundred largest publicly-disclosed Class A owners hold more than five percent of their
portfolio in the stock, starting with Buffett. 26 Many Berkshire shares are owned by people
for whom Berkshire is among their largest holdings.
At most U.S. corporations, boards and senior executives set corporate charitable
contribution policy, deciding how much to give and to what charities, out of some sense of
prerogative. Such an attitude is an anathema at Berkshire, where Buffett and Munger took
the board out of the equation to let shareholders name the charities of their choice. Under its
shareholder charitable contribution program, Berkshire’s board approved the amount of
money to donate, and then enabled each shareholder to name favored charities for their share
of that. The vast majority of shareholders participated, allocating $200 million over twenty
years. 27
Or consider Berkshire policy on dividends: aside from a small dividend in 1969, it
has never paid one. Buffett repeatedly explains Berkshire’s policy, which is to retain each
dollar of earnings so long as it translated into at least one dollar of market value. Most
companies, in contrast, pay a regular dividend without regard to relative available
opportunities for deploying retained earnings, and without consulting shareholders or
articulating the rationale. Berkshire has polled its shareholders on this policy on at least two
occasions, once in 1984 and again in 2014 and got the same answer both times: they
overwhelming endorse the policy, more than ninety percent affirming. 28 Few chief
executives poll their shareholders on anything, though they may hire consultants and experts,
again underscoring both Berkshire’s partnership attitude and disintermediation.
Most large public companies have a policy of regular stock splits. When stock price
rises above a certain level, such as $100 or $500, the board divides each share in two,
doubling the number outstanding and halving price. They do this to promote trading in the
stock, with the effect of feeding middlemen fees, including stockbrokers and stock
exchanges. Berkshire has shunned such a policy of stock splits, reducing the role and fees of
middlemen. The aversion to stock splits endured even when Berkshire’s stock price
surpassed dizzying heights. After reaching $30,000 in 1996, while most shareholders, with
no interest in selling, were content some, needing cash or wishing to make gifts, signaled
interest in lower price shares. At this time, as Berkshire’s stellar performance became well
known, demand rose among non-shareholders for a more affordable piece of the action.
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Inspired by the demand, two financial intermediaries designed an investment vehicle
to meet it. They proposed to create unit trusts that would buy the expensive Berkshire shares
and then issue fractional interests at far lower trading prices of around $500 each. To
eliminate the appeal of such trusts, and associated fees the promoters planned to charge,
Berkshire created two classes of stock, one with fractional voting and economic rights, set
to trade at around $1,000 per share. 29 The anti-intermediary move, aptly called
“ingenious,” 30 also enables existing Berkshire shareholders to create liquidity, as the pricey
Class A shares can be converted, tax-free, into the cheaper Class B shares.
The thrift undergirding Berkshire’s disintermediation was also reflected in the
underwriting fee in the Class B offering: 1.5% of the proceeds, far less than the thenprevailing average of 5.7%. 31 At Berkshire, the policy goes, if you cannot remove the
middleman, at least pay him less. In 1988, to give another example, Berkshire relisted its
stock from the Nasdaq to the New York Stock Exchange because trading costs there were
lower. 32
D. Trusted Managers
Another novel form of disintermediation at Berkshire concerns the internal corporate
management structure. At most companies, especially conglomerates, corporate tasks tend
to be centralized, with divisional and sub-division heads (“middle management”), reporting
hierarchies, systematic policies concerning budgeting, personnel, and intricate systems of
procedures and practice. Such structures entail incremental overhead in the name of effective
oversight. In contrast, with the exception of a basic internal auditing function, Berkshire
eschews such staples of corporate life as bureaucratic excess.
Berkshire devolves these and all other internal matters to its subsidiaries. Home
office overhead is negligible at Berkshire, with a staff of only two dozen, focused primarily
on financial reporting and auditing. Each subsidiary maintains its own programs and policies
concerning budgeting, operations, and personnel—as well as conventional departments such
as accounting, compliance, human resources, legal, marketing, technology, and so on.
Consistent with this decentralized approach, each subsidiary is led by respective
CEOs without direction or interference from headquarters. Berkshire defers as much as
possible to subsidiary chief executives with scarcely any central supervision. All quotidian
decisions qualify: advertising budget; product features and environmental quality; the
product mix and pricing. The same applies to decisions about hiring, merchandising,
inventory, and receivables management. Berkshire’s deference extends to subsidiary
decisions on succession to senior positions, including chief executive officer. Berkshire does
not transfer businesses between subsidiaries nor move managers around. 33 Berkshire has no
retirement policy and many chief executives work into their seventies or eighties.
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The only qualifications on managerial autonomy at Berkshire appear in a short letter
Buffett sends its unit chiefs every two years. The missive states the mandates Berkshire
places on subsidiary CEOs: (1) guard Berkshire’s reputation; (2) report bad news early; (3)
confer about post-retirement benefit changes and large capital expenditures (including
acquisitions, which are encouraged); (4) adopt a fifty-year time horizon; (5) refer any
opportunities for a Berkshire acquisition to Omaha; and (6) submit written successor
recommendations. 34
Buffett is particularly proud of Berkshire’s approach to executive compensation,
which he contends is based on ultimate rationality and never involves outside consultants.
He and each top executive simply agree on a base salary plus bonus based on achieving
desirable outcomes within the executive’s control. The time horizon often spans years,
rather than the customary calendar year, to reflect more faithfully the vicissitudes of given
businesses and to promote a longer time horizon.
Even as Berkshire minimizes its use of intermediaries, law imposes some unavoidable
requirements. As a public company, federal law requires an internal audit function, imposes
specific requirements on board audit committees and requires annual financial statements
audited by outside auditors. Auditing is a quintessential illustration of intermediation and reveals
both its appeal and limits. Shareholders may value external attestation of managerial financial
statement assertions, but since the company pays the auditors’ fees, the auditor is not as
independent as shareholders might wish. 35 That remains true despite legal reforms that put
auditor oversight in board audit committees rather than corporate managers. 36

II. STEWARDSHIP
In 1996, Buffett was a director of Gillette Co. and Berkshire owned eleven percent
of its stock. Gillette agreed to acquire Duracell International, Inc., then thirty-four percent
owned by the leveraged buyout firm, Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR), for $7 billion worth
of Gillette stock. After terms were agreed, KKR submitted a bill for its services, as well as
those of its co-advisor, Morgan Stanley & Co., of $30 million. The bill was high compared
to the $16 million Gillette’s advisors sought, but in line with prevailing advisory fees and,
on its face at 0.39% of the deal size, fractional. 37 Although the rest of the Gillette board
approved the fee, Buffett considered it excessive and protested by abstaining. Buffett figured
that, under the stock deal structure, existing Gillette shareholders would bear eighty percent
of Duracell’s fees which, given Berkshire’s eleven percent stake, translated into it
shouldering $2.64 million of the total.
A. Debt-Free Finance
Berkshire finances operations and acquisitions primarily through retained earnings,
with leverage contributed by insurance float and deferred taxes. Berkshire generally does
not use banks or other intermediaries. In the few cases where Berkshire has borrowed funds,
mostly for use of its capital intensive and regulated public utility and railroad business, loans
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are long-term and fixed-rate. 38 Use of traditional debt could juice Berkshire’s results, but
borrowed money is also costly and creates risk of default along with collateral damage.
Berkshire’s preferred sources of leverage are float in its insurance operations and
long holding periods that generate considerable levels of deferred taxes. Float refers to funds
insurance companies hold between the time premiums are received and claims paid. So long
as insurance underwriting breaks even (total premiums received equal expenses plus total
claims paid) the cost of float is zero. With an underwriting profit, an insurer can effectively
be paid for holding float, and even with modest underwriting losses, float is usually cheaper
than bank debt.
When done well over long periods of time, the amount of float can grow to large
proportions. At Berkshire, float rose from a mere $39 million in 1970 to $1.6 billion in 1990
and has soared in decades since, to $28 billion in 2000 to $66 billion in 2010 (and $84 billion
today). 39 Berkshire’s deferred taxes have accumulated to nearly $58 billion today, making
the total of these unconventional leverage sources $148 billion (for context, assets total $526
billion, liabilities $283 billion, and shareholders’ equity of $243 billion).
Such obligations are real liabilities, however, and poor underwriting can prove
disastrous. For example, underwriters may price risks too low in relation to eventual payouts,
whether due to competitive pressures or faulty actuarial modeling. Such poor underwriting
has drained many an insurer, rendering them insolvent. 40 But control is in their own hands,
rather than outsourced to lenders. Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries use compensation plans
designed to encourage underwriting discipline, with bonuses tied to underwriting profit and
the cost of float rather than to premium volume.
Unlike float (or deferred taxes), bank debt comes with covenants, stated interest, and
due dates. And loans are marketed by an agent whose interests conflict with those of
borrowers, whether concerning a loan’s size, duration, cost, or covenants. Berkshire’s
approach thus provides the leverage benefits of debt (more assets deployed) without the
costs, constraints, and conflicts. Ultimately, Berkshire’s model underscores the value of
fiscal self-reliance and self-discipline versus reposing either in financial intermediaries.
B. Frictionless Conglomerate Capital
Berkshire’s conglomerate structure enables internal cash reallocation to businesses
generating the highest returns on incremental capital. Berkshire’s success at such internal
capital reallocation has vindicated its conglomerate business model that has otherwise been
denigrated across corporate America. The strategy skillfully avoids intermediaries. Cashtransferring subsidiaries distribute cash to Berkshire without triggering any income tax
consequences. Cash-receiving subsidiaries obtain corporate funding without frictional costs
of borrowing, such as bank interest rates, loan covenants, and other constraints. Some
subsidiaries generate tax credits in their businesses that they cannot use but can be used by
sister subsidiaries.

10

Subsidiary managers prize the effortless source of funds. Outside Berkshire, a chief
executive needing funds faces layers of intermediation, starting with a board to obtain
authorization and financial advisors on the best sources and types of funding. These will in
turn involve underwriters for equity securities or banks for debt. In each case, there will be
fees, along with haggling over terms that put limits on the company’s flexibility, in
operations and financial management. Berkshire’s subsidiary managers avoid all of that:
when they want funds, they tell Buffett, the friendliest banker you can imagine: no
interference, contracts, conditions, covenants, due dates, or other constraints of
intermediation.
Conglomerate structures were fashionable in the 1960s and 1970s when companies
such as Gulf & Western, Litton, and LTV attracted wide followings among shareholders and
the press alike. Managers assembled diverse business assets under one roof on the theory of
diversification, buying companies whose varied financial characteristics would contribute
appealing net results in different economic environments. But those models lost their luster
in the 1980s.
Investor advocates began to stress that investors could obtain the diversification
advantages of conglomerates more cheaply and completely through owning a diverse
portfolio or index fund. Management theorists explained that managers would perform better
by focusing on specific industries rather than sprawling across many. Further, shareholder
returns for conglomerates often lagged the market or, when they surpassed it, proved to be
the product of accounting overstatements or exploitation of stock market volatility
(especially using high priced stock in acquisitions).
Many conglomerates still exist, including Danaher, General Electric, and United
Technologies, but their chief executives are often on the defensive. For example, shareholder
activist Nelson Peltz seeks to compel the break-up of DuPont, deriding it as a conglomerate.
While it is diversified across many chemical industries, DuPont is not sprawling in the
manner of the conglomerates of earlier decades—or Berkshire.
Berkshire has made the conglomerate structure work. Beyond a diverse portfolio of
overall good businesses supported by internal funding such as float and deferred taxes, the
reduced costs of financing are a factor. Independent rivals requiring capital rely on financial
intermediaries with associated costs in interest, fees, covenants, and the like that Berkshire
subsidiaries avoid. 41 The value of the cost savings amplifies as Berkshire accumulates
substantial amounts of excess cash that can be deployed opportunistically when acquisition
opportunities arise, another Berkshire piston that is likewise unusual for its lack of
intermediation.
C. Banker-Free Acquisitions
Most corporations, including conglomerates, adopt a formal plan charting desired
sectors in which to expand, sometimes even naming acquisition targets. Many companies
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have acquisition departments whose job is to scout for and seize opportunities. Such internal
functions exhibit some features common to intermediaries, including a valuable claim to
expertise but also potentially skewed incentives to favor activity when inaction would be
more prudent. 42 Berkshire has never had such a department or plan. Instead, when describing
given transactions in his annual letters, Buffett calls Berkshire’s acquisition strategy
“haphazard” and “serendipitous,” neither “carefully crafted” nor “sophisticated.” 43 The
disintermediation helps to avoid costly value-destroying acquisitions, one important factor
in Berkshire’s sustained success.
In the acquisitions market, companies commonly hire investment banks and other
intermediaries to broker deals. Berkshire generally avoids these. 44 Deal brokers charge fees,
often high ones. Many deal fees are contingent, giving brokers an incentive to close despite
a clients’ best interests. In such cases, acquisition costs are far greater than out-of-pocket
fees, however significant these are, measured by the difference in value between what was
invested and what was obtained. Munger quips about the optimal corporate strategy: hire
two bankers, one who is paid if the deal closes and the other who is paid if the deal does not
close.
Rather than rely on brokers, Berkshire from the outset used an ever growing network
of associates, partners, colleagues, and friends to bring acquisition opportunities. In
addition, in 1986, Berkshire ran an ad in the Wall Street Journal stating its interest in
acquisitions and criteria, which Buffett has repeated in his annual shareholder letters.
Consequently, Berkshire rarely initiates the process but responds to proposals from others.
Here are the sources of the thirty-five deals for which information appears in Berkshire’s
public disclosure. 45 Eleven involved sellers contacting Berkshire; nine arose when existing
business relationships contacted Buffett; seven involved friends or relatives reaching out to
Buffett; four involved Berkshire contacting the seller directly; and three were teed up by
strangers or acquaintances. 46
Professor DeMott, a leading authority on agency law and student of intermediation,
gives the example of Berkshire’s acquisition of Scott Fetzer, where a “major investment banking
house” tried unsuccessfully to find a buyer for the mid-sized diversified conglomerate. But after
a hostile raider targeted the conglomerate, Buffett contacted the latter’s CEO to discuss a deal,
which they quickly closed. Reprovingly, Buffett noted, the company still had to pay its banker
$2.5 million though it did not find the buyer. 47 As Berkshire’s experience suggests, Buffett
believes it is better for sellers and buyers to find each other directly than retain bankers or
brokers. A favorite Buffett line admonishes: “Don’t ask the barber whether you need a haircut.”

In typical acquisitions, as negotiations of the terms of agreement proceed,
accountants test a company’s controls and financial figures while lawyers probe contracts,
compliance, and litigation. Such examinations are usually done at corporate headquarters,
along with meetings where principals get acquainted and tour facilities. The heavily
intermediated process can take months and generate significant fees. Berkshire—proudly—
does little of that. Buffett sizes people up in minutes; deals are sometimes reached in an
initial phone call, often in meetings of less than two hours and invariably within a week.
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Formal contracts are completed within a week, ten days, or a month. Deals—including big
ones involving billions of dollars—can close within a month of the initial contact. The
process does not reflect lack of information but rather Buffett’s and Munger’s prodigious
business reading, which has yielded broad knowledge and familiarity with many companies.
Moreover, they have disciplined themselves to stick with areas of expertise, so if they lack
understanding they know it and pass.
Two examples observed by Robert Mundheim, former Dean of Penn Law School,
illuminate. 48 The first arose when Mundheim was a director of Benjamin Moore, a family
controlled company whose stock was also listed on the over-the-counter market. Having decided
it was time to go public or sell, the company retained financial advisors who, upon study,
suggested a sale and stated a price. But the firm could not find a buyer at the price they suggested.
So Mundheim suggested contacting Buffett, as Benjamin Moore was a Berkshire kind of
company. With the CEO’s blessing, Mundheim called Buffett, who expressed interest.
Asking only a few questions and for public documents, which Mundheim provided,
Buffett made a proposal within a week. He offered to acquire Benjamin Moore for $1 billion
cash and the board accepted—after Mundheim advised that seeking a higher price from Buffett
was probably futile. 49 Related investigations consisted of Buffett and Munger meeting with the
company’s CEO, Berkshire’s lawyers conducting basic due diligence, and Benjamin Moore
hiring a banker to give a fairness opinion. Mundheim is confident that involving more advisors,
particularly another investment bank, would not have added value to the transaction but only
added costs.
Mundheim’s second example concerned Salomon Inc., once a venerable investment
bank that faced oblivion due a criminal bond trading scandal in 1991. Berkshire owned
nearly [twenty] percent of Salomon’s stock and Buffett became chief executive to guide the
firm’s rebuilding. When that task was completed, Salomon was sold to Travelers. Though
Delaware case law such as Smith v. Van Gorkom prompted boards and advisors to get fairness
opinions for a sale, Salomon’s board opted not to, and Mundheim suggests this was an example
of Buffett’s aversion to such costly and redundant exercises. He points to the proxy statement’s
explanation: “a fairness opinion would have provided little, if any, incremental value to the
deliberations of the Salomon Board given the insurance and securities industry expertise of
the officers and directors of Salomon and its subsidiaries.”
Professor DeMott, in a review of the third edition of The Essays of Warren Buffett:
Lessons for Corporate America, discerned “a bracing tone of skepticism directed toward
transactional intermediaries,” which “intrigued her as scholar of agency law and
intermediation.” 50 Berkshire’s skepticism and self-reliance is unusual, she explained, and
suggested that it ties into its unique attributes at the parent level (highlighted in Part I above).
DeMott explains that the “skepticism running through The Essays encompasses concerns about
skill, competence, and overall effectiveness, as well as transaction costs associated with
intermediation and advisers.” 51 Consistent with Professor DeMott’s view, this article suggests
that autonomy and thrift undergird Berkshire’s allergies to intermediaries, a belief in the
superiority of conflict-free self-reliance and self-discipline.
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CONCLUSION
Berkshire and its shareholders prosper from unorthodox disintermediation that puts
more faith in self-reliance than is conventional in corporate America. The achievement occurs
during a period when law and norms have made it increasingly difficult to maintain such
autonomy and minimize costs. Law imposes costly and intermediated governance requirements
such as internal control systems, monitoring boards and regulated committee oversight. In
practice, corporate America grew an expensive bureaucratic culture internally while a growing
corps of financial advisors bids to sell shareholders a wide range of costly services. If some such
regulation and norms are desirable in some settings, Berkshire offers a dramatic counterexample. If not providing a model every company should follow, it is a compelling case for
letting corporations and their shareholders define their own practices, rather than having law or
peer pressure do so. 52 And some corporations and shareholders would do well to follow at least
some of the examples.

While financial disintermediation often appears to be a novel, technology-driven,
youthful element of today’s sharing economy, removing the middleman is a venerable and
prosaic business feat whose devotees can be stodgy. Warren Buffett is equally at home with
disintermediation as digital natives funding businesses with Kickstarter. Entrepreneurial
methods span from today’s internet apps and 3D printers back to old-fashioned direct
marketing by catalogues, 1-800 numbers, and door-to-door salesmen. With Berkshire’s
sprawling holdings as a microcosm of corporate America, its subsidiaries display a full range
of distribution strategies, with the degree of intermediation ruled by relative efficiency.
At Berkshire, where self-reliance and thrift are deeply ingrained, the company omits
the middleman at every turn, along the board of directors, among shareholders, in the
operating companies, and throughout its financing and acquisition activity. It is a unique
model of disintermediation worthy of far more emulation than it has received and an example
lawmakers and other companies alike should heed when considering new regulations or
nurturing new norms that add bureaucracies of intermediation to corporate America. True,
it begins from a “radical” conception of the corporation. Instead seeing shareholders as mere
“residual claimants” managers as “agents,” at Berkshire there are owners and stewards.
Maybe that’s why the Berkshire model is seldom copied in corporate America.
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